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Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets

Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada
lars.ehlers{at}umontreal.ca, http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/liste_personnel/ehlers_e.htm

Roth and Rothblum [Roth, A. E., U. G. Rothblum. 1999. Truncation strategies in matching markets—In search of advice for participants. Econometrica 67 21–43] showed that for matching markets using the deferred acceptance algorithm a physician with symmetric (incomplete) information possibly gains only by truncating her true ranking. We show that in symmetric information environments this result is identical for all priority mechanisms and all linear programming mechanisms introduced in British entry-level medical markets and in public school choice in some American cities.

Key Words: matching market; incomplete information; truncation
History: Received: December 15, 2006; revision received: July 1, 2007;