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Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies

Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91904, Israel
yairgo{at}cc.huji.ac.il

The minmax in repeated games with imperfect monitoring can differ from the minmax of those games with perfect monitoring when two or more players are able to gain common information known only to themselves, and utilize this information at a later stage. Gossner and Tomala showed that in a class of such games, the minmax is given by a weighted average of the payoffs of two main strategies: one in which the information is gained, and the other in which the information is utilized. However, all examples analyzed to date require only one main strategy in which information is created and utilized simultaneously. We show that two strategies are indeed needed by providing and solving a concrete example of a three-player game.

Key Words: repeated games; imperfect monitoring; entropy; correlation system
History: Received: December 17, 2003; revision received: November 29, 2005;

This article has been cited by other articles:

				O. Gossner and T. Tomala Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring Mathematics of Operations Research, May 1, 2007; 32(2): 413 - 424. [Abstract] [PDF]