Mathematics of Operations Research
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Vol. 29, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 861-877
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1040.0106
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Quint, T.
Right arrow Articles by Wako, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

Thomas Quint, Jun Wako

Department of Mathematics, University of Nevada at Reno, Reno, Nevada 89557
Department of Economics, Gakushuin University, Tokyo 171-8588 Japan

quint{at}unr.edu
jun.wako{at}gakushuin.ac.jp

We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley and Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single valued, or multi valued. We define a condition on such games called segmentability, which means that the set of players can be partitioned into a top trading segmentation. It generalizes Gale's well-known idea of the partition of players into top trading cycles (which is used to find the unique strict core allocation in the model with no indifference). We prove that a game has a nonempty strict core if and only if it is segmentable. We then use this result to devise an O(n3) algorithm which takes as input any houseswapping game, and returns either a strict core allocation or a report that the strict core is empty. Finally, we are also able to construct a linear inequality system whose feasible region's extreme points precisely correspond to the allocations of the strict core. This last result parallels the results of Vande Vate (1989) and Rothblum (1992) for the marriage game of Gale and Shapley (1962).

Key Words: Shapley-Scarf houseswapping game; indivisible good; strict core; top trading cycle; top trading segmentation; linear programming; polyhedron; extreme point; computational complexity
History: Received: March 27, 2002; revision received: February 14, 2003;revision received: February 20, 2004;





HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2004 by INFORMS.