This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Download to citation manager Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Orshan, G. Articles by Zarzuelo, JosAM. Search for Related Content

The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems

Dept. of Agriculture Economics and Management, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, P.O. Box 12, Rehovot, 76100, Israel, and Dept. of Mathematics, The Open University of Israel, 16 Klaussner Street, P.O.B. 39382, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 61392, Israel
Dept. of Applied Economics IV, University of the Basque Country, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain
Dpto. de Economía Aplicada IV, Facultad de C. Económicas, University of the Basque Country, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain
orshan{at}agri.huji.ac.il
elpvallf{at}bs.ehu.es
elpzazaj{at}bs.ehu.es

It is shown that the bilateral consistent prekernel, an NTU solution concept that generalizes the Nash bargaining solution by means of a principle of bilateral consistency, is nonempty and intersects the core for a sufficiently rich class of NTU games: the class of boundary separating games, also introduced here. A second contribution of this paper is the NTU extension of the bankruptcy games introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). These games, which provide a new approach for dealing with bargaining problems with claims, are shown to be boundary separating, so that the results apply.

Key Words: NTU games; prekernel; core; Nash solution; consistency; bankruptcy problems
History: Received: June 14, 2001; revision received: August 22, 2002;