Mathematics of Operations Research
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MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Vol. 26, No. 1, February 2001, pp. 82-88
DOI: 10.1287/moor.26.1.82.10591
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On the Value of Some Infinite Matrix Games

Luciano Méndez-Naya

Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para a Economía, Facultade de Ciencias Económicas e Empresariais, Avda. Xóan XXIII, s/n, 15704-Santiago de Compostela, Spain
eclmn1{at}usc.es

It is shown that a zero-sum two-person noncooperative game A defined by a bounded infinite matrix in which each row converges to the same real number ß and each column to the same real number {alpha} has a value V(A) if and only if {alpha} ≤ ß, in which case {alpha} ≤ V(A) ≤ ß. For any game defined by a bounded infinite matrix A ; (aij), a necessary condition for V(A) to exist is that infj lim infiaij ≤ supi lim supjaij.

Key Words: Two-person games; infinite matrix games; value of a game
History: Received: December 17, 1999; revision received: July 10, 2000;





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